Sampling Dynamics of a Symmetric Ultimatum Game

Jacek Miękisz () and Michał Ramsza ()

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2013, vol. 3, issue 3, 374-386

Abstract: We propose a dynamic three-strategy symmetric model of the Ultimatum Game with players using a sampling procedure. We allow an intermediate strategy, interpreted as a social norm, to evolve in time according to beliefs of players about an average offer. We show that a social norm converges to a self-consistent offer of about 15 % in the unique globally asymptotically stable equilibrium of our model. Copyright The Author(s) 2013

Keywords: Sampling dynamics; Ultimatum game; Social norm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-012-0064-5

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