Stackelberg Solutions of Differential Games in the Class of Nonanticipative Strategies

Yurii Averboukh () and Artem Baklanov

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2014, vol. 4, issue 1, 9 pages

Abstract: The reverse Stackelberg solution of a two-person nonzero-sum differential game is considered. We assume that the leader plays in the class of nonanticipative strategies. The main result is the description of the Stackelberg solutions via an auxiliary zero-sum differential game. The case when the leader’s strategies depend on the actual control of the follower is compared with the case when the leader uses nonanticipative strategies. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Reverse Stackelberg game; Nonanticipative strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s13235-013-0077-8 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:4:y:2014:i:1:p:1-9

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/13235

DOI: 10.1007/s13235-013-0077-8

Access Statistics for this article

Dynamic Games and Applications is currently edited by Georges Zaccour

More articles in Dynamic Games and Applications from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().