Pareto Improvements of Nash Equilibria in Differential Games

Atle Seierstad ()

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2014, vol. 4, issue 3, 363-375

Abstract: Frequently controls forming Nash equilibria in differential games are not Pareto optimal. This paper presents conditions that can be used to show the existence of strict Pareto improvements of Nash equilibria in such games. The conditions are based on standard tools in control theory. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Differential games; Nash equilibria; Pareto improvements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-013-0093-8

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