Stochastic Stability in Three-Player Games with Time Delays

Jacek Miȩkisz (), Michał Matuszak () and Jan Poleszczuk ()

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2014, vol. 4, issue 4, 489-498

Abstract: We discuss combined effects of stochasticity and time delays in finite-population three-player games with two mixed Nash equilibria and a pure one. We show that if basins of attraction of the stable interior equilibrium and the stable pure one are equal, then an arbitrary small time delay makes the pure one stochastically stable. Moreover, if the basin of attraction of the interior equilibrium is bigger than the one of the pure equilibrium, then there exists a critical time delay where the pure equilibrium becomes stochastically stable. Copyright The Author(s) 2014

Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Three-player games; Time delay; Stochastic stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-014-0115-1

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