Evolutionary Dynamics of the Handicap Principle: An Example

Pierre Bernhard ()

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2015, vol. 5, issue 2, 214-227

Abstract: For a model developed in a companion paper, we investigate how adaptive dynamics might have led to the Bayesian equilibrium found. In an appendix, we also explain from a dynamic viewpoint a lack of equilibrium in a closely related model also invesitgated in the companion paper. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Sexual selection; Handicap principle; Adaptive dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s13235-014-0108-0 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:5:y:2015:i:2:p:214-227

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/13235

DOI: 10.1007/s13235-014-0108-0

Access Statistics for this article

Dynamic Games and Applications is currently edited by Georges Zaccour

More articles in Dynamic Games and Applications from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().