Elementary Subpaths in Discounted Stochastic Games

Kimmo Berg ()
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Kimmo Berg: Aalto University School of Science

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2016, vol. 6, issue 3, No 3, 304-323

Abstract: Abstract This paper examines the subgame-perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games with finite state and action spaces. The fixed-point characterization of equilibria is generalized to unobservable mixed strategies. It is also shown that the pure-strategy equilibria consist of elementary subpaths, which are repeating fragments that give the acceptable action plans in the game. The developed methodology offers a novel way of computing and analyzing equilibrium strategies that need not be stationary nor Markovian.

Keywords: Game theory; Stochastic game; Subgame-perfect equilibrium; Equilibrium path; Fixed-point equation; Tree (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-015-0151-5

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