The Robustness of Hybrid Equilibria in Costly Signaling Games

Simon M. Huttegger () and Kevin J. S. Zollman ()
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Simon M. Huttegger: UC Irvine
Kevin J. S. Zollman: Carnegie Mellon University

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2016, vol. 6, issue 3, No 5, 347-358

Abstract: Abstract Recent work on costly signaling games has identified new Nash equilibria in addition to the standard costly signaling equilibrium as a possible explanation for signaling behavior. These so-called hybrid equilibria are Liapunov stable, but not asymptotically stable for the replicator dynamics. Since some eigenvalues of the hybrid equilibria have zero real part, this result is not structurally stable. The purpose of this paper is to show that under one reasonable perturbation of the replicator dynamics—the selection–mutation dynamics—rest points close to the hybrid equilibrium exist and are asymptotically stable. Moreover, for another plausible version of the replicator dynamics—Maynard Smith’s adjusted replicator dynamics—the same is true. This reinforces the significance of hybrid equilibria for signaling.

Keywords: Costly signaling games; Hybrid equilibrium; Replicator dynamics; Structural stability; Selection–mutation dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-015-0159-x

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