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Network Characteristics Enabling Efficient Coordination: A Simulation Study

Abhimanyu Khan, Ronald Peeters, Frank Thuijsman () and Philippe Uyttendaele ()
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Frank Thuijsman: Maastricht University
Philippe Uyttendaele: Maastricht University

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2016, vol. 6, issue 4, No 5, 495-519

Abstract: Abstract Using data generated by extensive simulations of a process where individuals interact globally in a coordination game and iteratively imitate the action of the most successful individual in their local neighbourhood, we study the characteristics of the observation network and distribution of initial choices that facilitate (a speedy) convergence to efficient coordination. Knowing these characteristics is crucial when intervening in social network structures with the intention to nudge society to a socially preferred outcome. The most important factor appears to be the share of individuals that are initially seeded with the socially desirable action. Only for a small window of this share, other factors, including the degree distribution in the network and the segregation of individuals using similar actions, have an influence on the dynamic process of achieving efficient coordination. Moreover, networks possessing the properties of a scale-free network are more likely to yield an efficient outcome compared to small-world networks.

Keywords: Coordination; Local imitation; Global random interaction; Networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Working Paper: Network characteristics enabling efficient coordination: A simulation study (2014) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-015-0169-8

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