Mean-Field-Game Model of Corruption

V. N. Kolokoltsov () and O. A. Malafeyev
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V. N. Kolokoltsov: University of Warwick
O. A. Malafeyev: St.-Petersburg State University

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2017, vol. 7, issue 1, No 3, 34-47

Abstract: Abstract A simple model of corruption that takes into account the effect of the interaction of a large number of agents by both rational decision making and myopic behavior is developed. Its stationary version turns out to be a rare example of an exactly solvable model of mean-field-game type. The results show clearly how the presence of interaction (including social norms) influences the spread of corruption by creating certain phase transition from one to three equilibria.

Keywords: Corruption; Mean-field games; Stable equilibria; Social norms; Phase transition; 91A06; 91A15; 91A40; 91F99 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-015-0175-x

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