EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

One-Way Flow Networks with Decreasing Returns to Linking

Filippo Vergara Caffarelli

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2017, vol. 7, issue 2, 323-345

Abstract: Abstract This paper presents a model of noncooperative network formation in which the benefit of new links eventually decreases. Agents link with each other to gain information and update their links according to better-reply dynamics. We show that all equilibrium networks display a center-periphery structure and may be disconnected. The only equilibrium networks that satisfy some strictness conditions are constellations of starred wheels, where central agents form possibly several optimally sized disjoint wheels and peripheral agents are linked to one of the wheels from outside. In the long run, the system settles to such a network architecture. The main features of a constellation of starred wheels are reminiscent of some well-known real-world facts. Collections of smaller disjoint networks connecting only a few agents are more common than global networks connecting all the agents in a community. Also differences within a connected component such as the center and the periphery are often found.

Keywords: Networks; Coordination; Learning dynamics; Noncooperative games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13235-015-0178-7 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:7:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s13235-015-0178-7

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/13235

Access Statistics for this article

Dynamic Games and Applications is currently edited by Georges Zaccour

More articles in Dynamic Games and Applications from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().

 
Page updated 2019-12-16
Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:7:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s13235-015-0178-7