The Continuous Time Infection–Immunization Dynamics

Reinhard Ullrich ()
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Reinhard Ullrich: University of Vienna

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2017, vol. 7, issue 3, No 8, 492-506

Abstract: Abstract Recently a new evolutionary game dynamics, the Infection–Immunization Dynamics,has been introduced for discrete time. In this paper a continuous time version of this model is derived and the existence and structure of solutions is analysed. This is a very challenging task, since standard technique existence theorems for Differential Inclusions do not hold in general. An extended solution concept, the notion of Krasovsky solutions, can be applied though. Some stability results are stated and discussed.

Keywords: Evolutionary stability; Equilibrium selection; Infection–Immunization Dynamics; Differential inclusion; Best response (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-016-0191-5

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