Stability of Feedback Solutions for Infinite Horizon Noncooperative Differential Games

Alberto Bressan () and Khai T. Nguyen ()
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Alberto Bressan: Penn State University
Khai T. Nguyen: North Carolina State University

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2018, vol. 8, issue 1, No 3, 42-78

Abstract: Abstract We consider a noncooperative game in infinite time horizon, with linear dynamics and exponentially discounted quadratic costs. Assuming that the state space is one-dimensional, we prove that the Nash equilibrium solution in feedback form is stable under nonlinear perturbations. The analysis shows that, in a generic setting, the linear-quadratic game can have either one or infinitely many feedback equilibrium solutions. For each of these, a nearby solution of the perturbed nonlinear game can be constructed.

Keywords: Noncooperative differential games; Nash equilibrium; Infinite horizon (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-016-0206-2

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