Evolutionary Stability of Polymorphic Population States in Continuous Games

Dharini Hingu (), K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao () and A. J. Shaiju ()
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Dharini Hingu: Indian Institute of Technology Madras
K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao: Indian Institute of Technology Bombay
A. J. Shaiju: Indian Institute of Technology Madras

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2018, vol. 8, issue 1, No 7, 156 pages

Abstract: Abstract Asymptotic stability of equilibrium in evolutionary games with continuous action spaces is an important question. Existing results in the literature require that the equilibrium state be monomorphic. In this article, we address this question when the equilibrium is polymorphic. We show that any uninvadable and finitely supported state is asymptotically stable equilibrium of replicator equation.

Keywords: Evolutionary games; Continuous action spaces; ESS; Replicator dynamics; Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-016-0207-1

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