Stochastic Differential Games for Which the Open-Loop Equilibrium is Subgame Perfect

Ricardo Josa-Fombellida () and Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero
Additional contact information
Ricardo Josa-Fombellida: Universidad de Valladolid

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2018, vol. 8, issue 2, No 7, 379-400

Abstract: Abstract It is generally admitted that a correct forecasting of uncertain variables needs Markov decision rules. In a dynamic game environment, this belief is reinforced if one focuses on credible actions of the players. Usually, subgame perfectness requires equilibrium strategies to be constructed on Markov rules. It comes as a surprise that there are interesting classes of stochastic differential games where the equilibrium based on open-loop strategies is subgame perfect. This fact is well known for deterministic games. We explore here the stochastic case, not dealt with up to now, identifying different game structures leading to the subgame perfectness of the open-loop equilibrium.

Keywords: Stochastic differential game; Open-loop strategies; Feedback strategies; Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium; 49N70; 49N90; 91A23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13235-017-0221-y Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:8:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s13235-017-0221-y

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/13235

DOI: 10.1007/s13235-017-0221-y

Access Statistics for this article

Dynamic Games and Applications is currently edited by Georges Zaccour

More articles in Dynamic Games and Applications from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().