A Game Theoretic Model of Wealth Distribution

Juan Pablo Pinasco (), Mauro Rodríguez Cartabia () and Nicolas Saintier ()
Additional contact information
Juan Pablo Pinasco: Universidad de Buenos Aires, Instituto de Matemática Santaló (IMAS), UBA-CONICET
Mauro Rodríguez Cartabia: Universidad de Buenos Aires, Instituto de Matemática Santaló (IMAS), UBA-CONICET
Nicolas Saintier: Universidad de Buenos Aires, Instituto de Matemática Santaló (IMAS), UBA-CONICET

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2018, vol. 8, issue 4, No 10, 874-890

Abstract: Abstract In this work, we consider an agent-based model in order to study the wealth distribution problem where the interchange is determined with a symmetric zero-sum game. Simultaneously, the agents update their way of play trying to learn the optimal one. Here, the agents use mixed strategies. We study this model using both simulations and theoretical tools. We derive the equations for the learning mechanism, and we show that the mean strategy of the population satisfies an equation close to the classical replicator equation. Concerning the wealth distribution, there are two interesting situations depending on the equilibrium of the game. For pure strategies equilibria, the wealth distribution is fixed after some transient time, and those players which initially were close to the optimal strategy are richer. When the game has an equilibrium in mixed strategies, the stationary wealth distribution is close to a Gamma distribution with variance depending on the coefficients of the game matrix. We compute theoretically their second moment in this case.

Keywords: Wealth distribution; Evolutionary games; Agent-based models; 91A22; 91B69; 91B60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13235-018-0240-3 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:8:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s13235-018-0240-3

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/13235

DOI: 10.1007/s13235-018-0240-3

Access Statistics for this article

Dynamic Games and Applications is currently edited by Georges Zaccour

More articles in Dynamic Games and Applications from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().