Matching, Imitation, and Coordination in Networks
Zhiwei Cui ()
Dynamic Games and Applications, 2019, vol. 9, issue 1, 47-67
Abstract This paper develops a coevolutionary model of social coordination and matching in which agents are embedded in an arbitrary fixed network and are matched in pairs to play a coordination game. In each period, based on payoff comparison with their neighbors, agents decide whether to imitate their neighbors’ actions and whether to end their present partnerships. Inertia exists in action revision and partnership updating. Each agent can exit a partnership unilaterally. All separated agents are randomly matched in pairs at the beginning of the next period. Occasionally, agents make mistakes in action revision and partnership updating. When the size of the society is large, in the long run, all agents will play the Pareto-efficient action for a particular subset of networks.
Keywords: Networks; Coordination game; Matching; Imitation; Coevolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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