Spiteful behavior can make everybody better off

Robert Philipowski ()
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Robert Philipowski: Universität Bonn

Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, 2016, vol. 13, issue 1, No 6, 113-116

Abstract: Abstract We present examples of symmetric two-player games admitting a unique Nash equilibrium and a unique evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and such that the ESS payoff is strictly higher than the Nash payoff. In this sense, we show that spiteful behavior can make everybody better off.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; Evolutionarily stable strategy; Spiteful behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/s40844-016-0035-4

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