Endogenous elites: power structure and patron-client relationships
Petros Sekeris ()
Economics of Governance, 2011, vol. 12, issue 3, 237-258
Keywords: Weak institutions; Autocracy; Rent seeking; Elites (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Endogenous Elites: Power Structure and Patron-Client Relationships (2010)
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