The ancient olympics as a signal of city-state strength

Douglas Allen () and Vera Lantinova

Economics of Governance, 2013, vol. 14, issue 1, 23-44

Abstract: Ancient Greece was wealthy enough to invent many of the foundations of Western Civilization. In order to accomplish this, they had to avoid the trap of dissipating wealth through continuous feuding. We contend that the ancient Olympics was one, of several, institutions that helped achieve this by acting as a signal of city-state strength. Although it could not prevent all battles, it provided information to reduce hostilities between competing cities. This hypothesis explains the rise and fall of the Olympics, and the unique and puzzling characteristics of the rules and events. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Keywords: Ancient Greece; Olympics; Signals; Property rights; N40; N43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-012-0119-5

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