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Do bailouts buy votes? Evidence from a panel of Hessian municipalities

Thushyanthan Baskaran

Economics of Governance, 2013, vol. 14, issue 3, 257-278

Abstract: I study whether bailouts of local governments carry electoral benefits for state governments with a dataset covering 421 municipalities in the German state of Hesse over the period 1999–2011. I find that past bailouts have no economically significant effect on the municipality-level vote share of the parties that formed the state government in subsequent state elections. On the other hand, bailouts lead to vote increases for the ruling parties in subsequent local elections. On balance, these results suggest that electoral concerns are not the reason why central governments find it difficult to commit to a no-bailout policy. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Keywords: Subnational bailouts; State-level elections; Local fiscal policy; H30; H74; H77; D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-013-0128-z

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