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Importance of status quo when lobbying a coalition government

R. Emre Aytimur ()

Economics of Governance, 2014, vol. 15, issue 3, 203-219

Abstract: Lobbying a coalition government is different from lobbying a single-party government, since in the case of a coalition government, the interest group can intervene in the intragovernmental decision process. In the case where the interest group prefers the status quo to the surplus maximizing policy, the interest group influences the policy without any contribution due to its credible threat to block unfavorable proposals. Furthermore, we show that when, say, a leftist coalition government may be replaced by a rightist coalition government, the final policy reflects a rightist interest group’s preferences more heavily due to the interest group’s forward-looking considerations. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: Lobbying; Coalition governments; Status quo; Policy-making; Interest group contribution; C78; D72; D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-014-0142-9

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