Within-group heterogeneity and civil war

Nobuhiro Mizuno () and Ryosuke Okazawa ()

Economics of Governance, 2017, vol. 18, issue 2, No 3, 153-177

Abstract: Abstract This study offers a bargaining model of conflict in which the government offers a transfer to an opposition group to preclude civil war. Members of the opposition are heterogeneous in income and ideology, and heterogeneity generates disagreement about whether to accept the government’s offer. We assume that the probability that the government’s offer will preclude conflict increases continuously with the number of opposition group members who agree to accept it. When within-group heterogeneity is large, the number of members who are receptive to the government’s offer is less responsive to an increase in the transfer level. In this situation, the government must substantially increase its transfer to attract the support of the opposition. Subsequently, as peace becomes more costly for the government, negotiations are likely to break down.

Keywords: Bargaining; Civil war; Heterogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D31 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Working Paper: Within-group heterogeneity and civil war (2015)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-016-0189-x

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