EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Delegation of board work to committees in Europe

Pablo de Andrés (), Laura Arranz-Aperte () and Juan Antonio Rodríguez-Sanz ()
Additional contact information
Pablo de Andrés: Autónoma University of Madrid
Laura Arranz-Aperte: Autónoma University of Madrid
Juan Antonio Rodríguez-Sanz: University of Valladolid

Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Pablo de Andrés Alonso ()

Economics of Governance, 2017, vol. 18, issue 2, No 4, 179-208

Abstract: Abstract A sample of 6169 firm year observations in 14 western European countries between 2002 and 2009 is used to investigate how committee practice within boards of directors is related to company characteristics, and to the existence of alternative corporate governance instruments in place. We find that committees in Europe are prevalent in larger companies, and in companies with large and independent boards. However, we also find that leverage, director interlocking, concentrated ownership, and the presence of managers on the board mitigate the use of committees, suggesting that committee use is limited by the existence of alternative governance mechanisms. Consequently, recent regulatory changes in Europe that promote the creation of committees within boards may be unsuited for certain types of company, especially smaller companies and those with concentrated ownership.

Keywords: Board of directors; Committees; Corporate governance; European companies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 L51 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10101-017-0191-y Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:18:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10101-017-0191-y

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... cs/journal/10101/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10101-017-0191-y

Access Statistics for this article

Economics of Governance is currently edited by Amihai Glazer and Marko Koethenbuerger

More articles in Economics of Governance from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2021-05-23
Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:18:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10101-017-0191-y