Political regimes: a coalition formation approach

Ahmed Saber Mahmud ()
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Ahmed Saber Mahmud: Applied Economics Advanced Academic Program, Johns Hopkins University

Economics of Governance, 2017, vol. 18, issue 3, No 2, 239-273

Abstract: Abstract What leads to the stability of a particular regime and what causes its demise? With the aid of formal modeling, the paper illustrates the necessary and sufficient conditions for different political regimes to exist. The game involves two factions representing the differing interests of the civil society and the armed forces of a nation. We illustrate the emergence of political regimes that includes both unconstrained and constrained democracies, both military and civilian autocracies and an alliance formed by a segment of the civil society and the military.

Keywords: Democracy; Military regime; Coalition formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-017-0193-9

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