Co-voting democracy

Hans Gersbach

Economics of Governance, 2017, vol. 18, issue 4, No 2, 337-349

Abstract: Abstract We outline a new voting procedure for representative democracies. This procedure should be used for important decisions only and consists of two voting rounds: a randomly-selected subset of the citizens is awarded a one-time voting right. The parliament also votes, and the two decisions are weighted according to a pre-defined key. The final decision is implemented. As this procedure gives the society—represented by the randomly-chosen subset—a better say for important decisions, the citizens might be more willing to accept the consequences of these decisions.

Keywords: Co-voting; Representative democracy; Citizen participation; Legitimacy of democracy; Assessment Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-017-0195-7

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