Weekend racer: cheating and self-governance in road racing

Leonid Krasnozhon () and John Levendis
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Leonid Krasnozhon: Loyola University New Orleans
John Levendis: Loyola University New Orleans

Economics of Governance, 2018, vol. 19, issue 1, No 4, 75-90

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies how reputation enforces socially cooperative behavior in road racing in the New Orleans metro area. We find that reputation mechanisms have a much stronger effect for frequent road racers than for members of the New Orleans Track Club. We find that club membership cuts cheating in half while a runner who has finished at least one-third of the 2013 running season does not cheat. Thus, self-governance eliminates corruption when there is a reputational mechanism in place. Since data on informal running clubs are unavailable, our analysis underestimates the effect of club membership on socially cooperative behavior in road racing.

Keywords: Self-governance; Cheating; Road race (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J16 J2 J22 J71 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-017-0199-3

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