Economics of evaluation (with special reference to promotion and tenure committees)

Tim Perri

Economics of Governance, 2018, vol. 19, issue 1, No 1, 19 pages

Abstract: Abstract Previous research suggests that universities that fear tenuring bad candidates more than they fear rejecting good candidates would optimally have both department and outside evaluating committees. I find that a higher relative cost of accepting bad candidates is neither necessary nor sufficient for the optimality of more than one committee. Also, with some probability, t, the administration will tenure one with split recommendations from two committees, if one committee is more accurate than the other, one structure will have fewer errors of both types for some range of t, and possibly a lower expected loss from errors for all t.

Keywords: Promotion; Tenure; Hierarchy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-017-0200-1

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