Camaraderie, common pool congestion, and the optimal size of surf gangs

Franklin Mixon

Economics of Governance, 2018, vol. 19, issue 4, No 4, 396 pages

Abstract: Abstract This study integrates some of the seminal public choice research on clubs and recent research on prison gangs into an analysis of the formation of surf gangs. More specifically, this study presents a model examining how surf break congestion, localism effort, and surfing camaraderie work to determine the optimal size of a local surf gang. The benefits of surfing in groups fall under the heading of camaraderie, and their presence means that the optimal surf gang size is bounded away from one. The benefits of camaraderie in surfing will likely be exhausted at small numbers owing to crowding of the surf break.

Keywords: Common-property resources; Club goods; Public choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 K11 Q21 Q26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-018-0211-6

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