The economics of politics: patronage and political selection in Italy

Federico Quaresima and Fabio Fiorillo ()
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Fabio Fiorillo: Universita Politecnica delle Marche

Economics of Governance, 2020, vol. 21, issue 1, No 2, 27-48

Abstract: Abstract This article investigates patronage in the Second Italian Republic by considering patronage a fundamental device able to guarantee a party presence in the governance of public bodies. The study sheds light on a particular area of party patronage, namely political appointments concerning legislators; it analyzes the factors which could determine whether a member of Parliament will be appointed to a state-owned enterprise’s board of directors after a legislature, seeking to gain a better understanding of how political actors exploit this opportunity. Direct political connections can be conceptualized as instruments to control and reward politicians and/or strategies to enhance political control over the bureaucracy. The empirical investigation suggests that legislators’ efforts in Parliament play a role in the likelihood of patronage appointments. Education does not seem to significantly increase the probability of receiving a nomination for a seat on public firms’ boards, moreover our result casts doubt on the merits or competencies of the appointed politicians.

Keywords: Public firms; Patronage; Appointments of politicians (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: The Economics of Politics: Patronage and Political Selection in Italy (2016)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-019-00231-5

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