Borda paradox in the 2017 Iranian presidential election: empirical evidence from opinion polls
Mehdi Feizi,
Rasoul Ramezanian () and
Saeed Malek Sadati ()
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Rasoul Ramezanian: Ferdowsi University of Mashhad
Economics of Governance, 2020, vol. 21, issue 2, No 1, 113 pages
Abstract:
Abstract Different voting paradoxes identified by social choice theorists have rarely been documented in real-world elections. The collected data from the opinion polls in the 2017 Iranian presidential election provides substantial empirical evidence indicating that during the electoral campaigns, strong Borda paradox (the Condorcet loser wins plurality.) and weak Borda paradox (An alternative that is not the Condorcet winner wins plurality.) have occurred. At the same time, there was no evidence of a Condorcet paradox, i.e., a cycle among the top three candidates. The results support the empirical relevance of theoretical paradoxes in social choice and a call for the importance of voting procedures.
Keywords: Social choice; Condorcet paradox; Borda paradox; Iranian presidential election; Voting methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:21:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s10101-019-00233-3
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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-019-00233-3
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