Economic institutions and horizontal checks and balances in the Chinese bureaucratic system: evidence at the prefecture-city level

Yang Zhou ()
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Yang Zhou: University of North Texas

Economics of Governance, 2022, vol. 23, issue 2, No 3, 133-160

Abstract: Abstract In China, “democratic centralism” complicates horizontal and vertical bargaining among politicians. Higher-level cadres need to consider not only principal-agent (vertical) relationships but also (horizontal) relationships between lower-level politicians when making personnel appointments. Using provincial-level economic, demographic, and institutional data as well as prefecture-city-level politician-background data from 2000 to 2009, this paper investigates how economic institutions influence the degree of match between prefecture-city party chiefs and mayors. These prefecture-city-level politicians are appointed by province-level politicians, who face institutional constraints. OLS and instrumental-variable-approach results and robustness-test results suggest that more of one such constraint—economic freedom—in one province reduces the difference in biographical background and career experience between party chiefs and mayors but increases the difference in ideology.

Keywords: Divided government; Division of power; Party chiefs; Mayors; Socialist regimes; Institutions; China; D70; H10; N40; P30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-022-00276-z

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