A theory of autocratic transition by government leaders: prerequisites to self-enforcing democracy

Thomas Apolte

Economics of Governance, 2022, vol. 23, issue 2, No 4, 189 pages

Abstract: Abstract This paper aims at contributing to a better understanding of the conditions of self-enforcing democracy by analyzing the recent wave of autocratic transitions. Based on a game-theoretic framework, we work out the conditions under which governments may induce the diverse public authorities to coordinate on extra-constitutional activities, eventually transforming the politico-institutional setting into one of autocratic rule. We find three empirically testable characteristics that promote this coordination process, namely: populism and public support, corruption, and a lack in the separation of powers. By contrast, low degrees of corruption and strongly separated powers can be viewed as prerequisites to self-enforcing democracy.

Keywords: Self-enforcing democracy; Political regimes; Autocratic transition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D72 D74 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-022-00277-y

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