An artefactual field experiment of group discrimination between sports fans

Craig Depken, Adam J. Hoffer () and Abdul H. Kidwai ()
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Adam J. Hoffer: University of WI, La Crosse
Abdul H. Kidwai: University of WI, La Crosse

Economics of Governance, 2022, vol. 23, issue 3, No 11, 432 pages

Abstract: Abstract This paper describes the outcome of an artefactual field experiment of group discrimination using sports fans. The behavior of individuals whose identity is deeply tied to a larger group or popular institution is politically important, particularly when it comes to crafting public policy. Sports fans provide a unique opportunity to study individuals who openly identify their in-group and rival groups. The study identifies within-subject group-based discrimination by quantifying the difference in dictator game takes (out of a possible $10) between fans of an individual’s self-professed team and fans of an individual’s self-professed rival. Fifty-two sports fans each participated in nine separate power-to-take dictator games with group identification spanning three levels (NCAA Division III, NCAA Division I, and professional) of football fandom. The results suggest that individuals discriminate between in-group and out-group members. The average takings ratio with same-team fans is 0.657 while the average takings ratio with other-team fans is 0.848 and the difference of 0.190 is statistically different from zero. We discuss the results in the context of team and league governance focusing on fan interactions.

Keywords: Discrimination; Sports fans; Experiment; Dictator game; Behavioral economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 L83 Z21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-022-00278-x

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