Property rights, transaction costs, and the limits of the market

Carmine Guerriero

Economics of Governance, 2023, vol. 24, issue 2, No 1, 143-176

Abstract: Abstract To clarify the determinants and interaction of property rights and transaction costs, I study the design of the property rights on either a good whose consensual transfer entails a transaction inefficiency or an upstream firm’s input whose random cost is nonverifiable and ex ante non-contractible. More disperse traders’ valuations and larger odds that the upstream party can appropriate the quasi-rent induced by contract incompleteness produce more severe transaction inefficiencies and larger incomplete contracting costs, respectively. Larger transaction costs, in turn, induce weaker property rights because of the trade-off between inefficient exclusion from trade/innovation and expropriation. These implications survive when some transactors have more political influence on institutional design, or I consider the disincentive effect of weak property rights. Furthermore, they are consistent with the interplay among proxies for the availability of technological progress, severity of transaction costs and strength of property rights for 139 countries observed between 2006 and 2018.

Keywords: Property rights; Transaction costs; Preference dispersion; Innovation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D40 K11 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and the Limits of the Market (2017)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00290-9

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