 Too much scienceEconomics of Governance, 2025, vol. 26, issue 4, No 1, 469-490 Abstract: Abstract Scientific production is growing at an unprecedented rate, but how many of the published articles are really useful to society? Using a model of asymmetric information, I identify the conditions under which scientific journals might publish more articles than would be socially efficient. I also show that publishing all the science would certainly be inefficient. These results apply to both submission fee and free submission publication systems. To avoid this social inefficiency, policymakers could keep inefficient researchers out of the market by offering, for example, a subsidy or alternative employment in the public sector. In this sense, the division of academic labor between research and teaching would be helpful in streamlining the research market. The paper also examines the role of meritocracy, highlighting the negative consequences of decoupling researchers’ revenues from the scientific impact of their work. Keywords: Economics of science; Information economics; Innovation; Information asymmetry; Knowledge; Research policy (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:26:y:2025:i:4:d:10.1007_s10101-025-00335-1 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/s10101-025-00335-1 Access Statistics for this article Economics of Governance is currently edited by Amihai Glazer and Marko Koethenbuerger More articles in Economics of Governance from Springer |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.