Frequent probabilistic punishment in law enforcement

Orit Perry, Ido Erev and Ernan Haruvy

Economics of Governance, 2002, vol. 3, issue 1, 86 pages

Abstract: Timing and frequency of punishment are critical elements in law enforcement. Previous studies suggest the superiority of immediate punishment schemes over delayed punishment, as well as the importance of frequent punishment. Yet law enforcement schemes which utilize both frequent and immediate punishment are often cost prohibitive. In this work, we propose the “bad lottery immediate punishment” as an effective substitute to immediate punishment. This is a punishment mechanism that signals immediately to an offender that his violation has been spotted, but the actual penalty is delayed and probabilistic. We discuss implications in law enforcement, where probabilistic punishment is potentially more cost effective. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Keywords: Key words: law enforcement; reinforcement learning, JEL Classification: C91, D78, K42, (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:3:y:2002:i:1:p:71-86

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DOI: 10.1007/s101010100033

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