Vertical externalities and control of politicians

Matthias Wrede

Economics of Governance, 2002, vol. 3, issue 2, 135-151

Abstract: A major role of (repeated) elections is to create incentives for politicians to act in the interests of voters. This paper considers the disciplining role of elections in countries with either one or two levels of government. Simple retrospective voting strategies which are based on cut-off levels with respect to expenditure and tax rates are considered. It is shown that the power of voters is weakened if a second independent level of government is added. However, voters can partially reinforce their power by making politicians not only liable for their own policy, but also for the policy carried out at each other level of government. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Keywords: Key words: voting theory; separation of powers; vertical fiscal externalities; JEL classification: D7; H0; H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:3:y:2002:i:2:p:135-151

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DOI: 10.1007/s101010100035

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