Pre-assigned rents and bureaucratic friction

Nava Kahana and Shmuel Nitzan

Economics of Governance, 2002, vol. 3, issue 3, 248 pages

Abstract: In this paper we study the endogenous determination of bureaucratic friction in a bureaucratic contest with ( ) and without (n=1) rent contestability. When n= 1 bureaucratic impediments induce the individual to undertake rent-securing activities at the same level as in the two-player rent-seeking contest. However, under rent contestability the bureaucracy no longer serves as a means of extracting resources from the public. The paper concludes with the study of the effect of ‘net costs’ on bureaucratic friction. It turns out that under cotestability the only reason for creating bureaucratic friction is the ‘negative costs’ it incurs while when n=1 the effect of the bureaucrat's net costs of generating bureaucratic friction on the optimal degree of such friction is ambiguous. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Keywords: Key words: endogenous bureaucratic impediments; rent-securing contest; rent-seeking contest; rent-contestability, JEL Classification: D72, (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:3:y:2002:i:3:p:241-248

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DOI: 10.1007/s101010200046

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