Lobbying contests with alternative instruments

Gil Epstein and Carsten Hefeker

Economics of Governance, 2003, vol. 4, issue 1, 89 pages

Abstract: This is a model of a contest where, in order to win, each opponent can use two instruments. The probabilities of winning are explored, as well as the expenditures of the interest groups, and the relative rent-dissipation in both cases where the players have the option to use only one instrument (the standard Tullock contest) and where the players have the option to use two instruments in the contest. We show that the use of two instruments strengthens the player with the higher stake, decreases the relative rent dissipation and it decreases total expenditure if the parties are sufficiently asymmetric. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Key words: Rent-seeking; rent-dissipation; lobbying; JEL Classification: C72; D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

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DOI: 10.1007/s101010200049

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