Do congressional leaders detect and deter cartel cheating? Evidence from committee assignments

Amanda B. Chittom and Franklin Mixon

Economics of Governance, 2003, vol. 4, issue 2, 175 pages

Keywords: Key words: Cartels; public choice; political loyalty; congressional committees; JEL classification:D71; D72; H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s101010200057

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