On evolutionarily stable behavior in contests

Wolfgang Leininger ()

Economics of Governance, 2003, vol. 4, issue 3, 177-186

Abstract: It is argued in this paper that the solution concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is an adequate analysis tool for contest theory. Moreover, it is shown that in a contest ESS always differs from Nash equilibrium, the hitherto dominant solution concept in contest theory. Finally, an interpretation of finite population ESS contest behavior in terms of Nash behavior is supplied. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Conflict theory; contest; evolutionarily stable behavior; appropriation; expropriation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (49)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:4:y:2003:i:3:p:177-186

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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-002-0055-x

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