Social identity, inequality, and conflict: correction and extension

Brian Hutter ()

Economics of Governance, 2003, vol. 4, issue 3, 267 pages

Abstract: This paper corrects and extends the analysis in “Social Identity, Inequality, and Conflict” by James Robinson (Economics of Governance, 2(1), 2001). For conflict along class lines, Robinson finds the total impact of mobility on conflict to be ambiguous. Contrary to his result, I show that, under his assumptions, the effect of social mobility on class conflict is unambiguous. Higher mobility always decreases conflict. In my extension to Robinson’s model, I explore mobility’s impact on class conflict in a society where the tax rate is not fixed. I demonstrate that if the tax rate is proportional to the population of the group in power relative to the total population of the society, then the effects of social mobility on class conflict are indeed ambiguous. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Groups; social mobility; cleavages; conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:4:y:2003:i:3:p:261-267

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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-003-0065-3

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