More evidence that university administrators are utility maximizing bureaucrats

Dennis Coates, Brad Humphreys and Michelle Vachris

Economics of Governance, 2004, vol. 5, issue 1, 77-101

Abstract: Coates and Humphreys (2000) found evidence that administrators affect enrollment supply and faculty demand using a panel of eleven public colleges and universities in Maryland, implying that institutions have enough market power to permit the preferences of administrators to influence these variables. We extend this framework to include political constraints on administrators’ behavior and add data from public higher education in Virginia. The results from these extensions are consistent with the earlier findings. However, we find that political considerations and differences in the governance of higher education in the two states have relatively little influence on enrollment supply and faculty demand decisions of university administrators. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Keywords: Enrollment supply; political constraints; higher education (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-003-0064-4

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