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Moral suasion: An alternative tax policy strategy? Evidence from a controlled field experiment in Switzerland

Benno Torgler

Economics of Governance, 2004, vol. 5, issue 3, 235-253

Abstract: With data gained from a controlled field experiment in Switzerland this paper analyses the effects of moral suasion on the timely paying and the timely filling out of the tax form 2001. Comparisons of different tax filing years and multiple regression estimations have been done using these two factors as dependent variables to check if there is a significant difference between the control group and the treatment group. In February 2002 the treatment group received a letter signed by the commune’s fiscal commissioner containing normative appeals. Results indicate that moral suasion has hardly any effect on taxpayers’ compliance behaviour. The strongest effect can be observed for the variable tax payments. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Keywords: Tax compliance; morale suasion; field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (87)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-004-0077-7

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