The rise of environmentalism, pollution taxes and intra-industry trade

Toke Aidt

Economics of Governance, 2004, vol. 6, issue 1, 12 pages

Abstract: This paper develops a political-economy model to investigate to what extent a rise of environmentalism can successfully encourage higher pollution taxes and reduce pollution. The model focuses on special-interest group politics, intra-industry trade and a transnational environmental externality. The main finding is that a rise of environmentalism is not sufficient to protect the environment when pollution is relatively immobile and environmentalists are concerned with pollution in other countries than their own. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Keywords: Transnational externalities; pollution taxes; lobby groups and trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: The Rise of Environmentalism, Pollution Taxes and Intra-Industry Trade (2000)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-004-0087-5

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