A note on CEO compensation, elimination tournaments and bankruptcy risk

Guido Friebel () and Alexander Matros

Economics of Governance, 2005, vol. 6, issue 2, 105-111

Abstract: We investigate an economy in which firms have different risks to go bankrupt. We observe two things: first, workers in firms with higher bankruptcy risk (bad firms) always work less than workers in good firms. Second, the CEOs of bad firms may nonetheless receive larger wages. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Keywords: Tournaments; agency; incentives; compensation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10101-005-0104-3 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:6:y:2005:i:2:p:105-111

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... cs/journal/10101/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10101-005-0104-3

Access Statistics for this article

Economics of Governance is currently edited by Amihai Glazer and Marko Koethenbuerger

More articles in Economics of Governance from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().