Credit claiming

Amihai Glazer and Bjorn Segendorff

Economics of Governance, 2005, vol. 6, issue 2, 125-137

Abstract: We consider a leader and a subordinate he appoints who work in a team. The public observes the organization’s performance, but not the separate contribution of the leader or of the subordinate. The leader may therefore claim credit for the good work of his subordinate. We find conditions which induce the leader to claim credit (both truthfully and untruthfully), and the conditions which lead the leader to appoint a subordinate of low ability. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Keywords: Personnel economics; reputation; worker quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Working Paper: Credit Claiming (2001)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-005-0106-1

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