On thugs and heroes: Why warlords victimize their own civilians

Jean-Paul Azam ()

Economics of Governance, 2006, vol. 7, issue 1, 53-73

Abstract: Violence against civilians is the mainstay of modern warfare, and claims 84% of the war-related casualties. Looting and terror are the two main reasons why the soldiers victimize the civilians from the other side. However, examples have been found (Congo, Sierra Leone,...) where the guerilla and the incumbent army abuse the civilians from their own side. The present paper offers a potential explanation for this phenomenon, based on strategic looting. It argues that this behavior helps drawing a line between thugs and legitimate rebels. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

Keywords: Looting; violence; warlords (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Working Paper: On Thugs and Heroes: Why Warlords Victimize Their Own Civilians? (2004)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-004-0090-x

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