Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game

Michael Finus (), Ekko van Ierland and Rob Dellink

Economics of Governance, 2006, vol. 7, issue 3, 291 pages

Keywords: International environmental agreements; Kyoto-Protocol; Cartel formation; Stability of coalitions; Non-cooperative game theory; C72; H41; Q25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (59)

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Working Paper: Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game (2003)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-005-0009-1

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