 Political Preference Functions, Trade Wars, and Trade NegotiationsEmpirical Economics, 1995, vol. 20, issue 1, 49-73 Abstract: The integration of elementary political considerations into computable general equilibrium models is considered, and an extended illustration to agricultural trade negotiations provided. The application involves an evaluation of the payoffs of alternative support levels to agricultural and non-agricultural interests in the EC and the US. A government political preference function for each region is calibrated as a CES aggregation of the payoffs to the two interest groups, with weights corresponding to their benchmark political influence. The political preference function is presumed to be employed by each government to determine the level of agricultural support. The analysis illustrates how sensitive such computable general equilibrium models can be to elementary political considerations, mainly due to the flatness of the implied Pareto frontier. It also illustrates how one can modify the traditional political preference function approach to accommodate possible convexities of the Pareto frontier in empirical models. Date: 1995 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:empeco:v:20:y:1995:i:1:p:49-73 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Empirical Economics is currently edited by Robert M. Kunst, Arthur H.O. van Soest, Bertrand Candelon, Subal C. Kumbhakar and Joakim Westerlund More articles in Empirical Economics from Springer |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.